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1. INTRODUCTION
Prediction markets are platforms designed to aggregate dispersed information about some future event
from a potentially diverse crowd of informants. It is generally assumed that the agents who participate
in the market by trading may have superior information about the relevant event, but have no direct
control over the outcome. However, prediction markets are often used in situations where this assump-
tion is violated to a greater or lesser degree. In fact, sometimes it is the very potential for violation that
gives agents the informational edge that prediction markets get their value from.
Consider three of the canonical real-world examples where prediction markets (or betting markets)
have demonstrated their forecasting ability to great effect: elections/politics [Berg et al. 2008], sport-
ing events [Wolfers and Zitzewitz 2004], and software product releases [Cowgill et al. 2010]. In each of
these cases, it is easy to see how the presence of a prediction market on the event may distort incen-
tives. For instance, a congressional staffer or member of congress may know more about the probable
outcome of a key vote than the general public, but is also in a position to influence said outcome.
While it is acknowledged that prediction markets have value as forecasting tools that may help in
making business and policy decisions, they have gone through cycles of hype and bust for reasons that
include regulatory concerns about manipulation. The emblematic anecdote about this problem is the
failure of DARPA’s proposed Policy Analysis Markets which were caricatured in the media as “ter-
rorism futures” [Hanson 2007b; Stiglitz 2003]. There are obviously prediction markets that will not
work but stock and futures markets have been used for a long time as predictive tools, and prediction
markets are no different in essence. The key is to understand when markets may be prone to manipu-
lation and how much to trust them. There is a large body of work, both theoretical and experimental,
on various types of manipulative behavior in prediction markets, their impact, and possible remedies
[Ottaviani and Sørensen 2007; Chen et al. 2009; Shi et al. 2009; Hanson et al. 2006].
We introduce a new game-theoretic model of prediction markets that captures two aspects of real-
world prediction markets: (1) agents directly influence the outcome that the market is set up to predict,
(2) some of the agents who have influence over the outcome may not participate in the prediction mar-
ket (e.g. not every voter trades in an election prediction market). We are not concerned with markets
where an individual has a very small effect on the outcome (like large elections), so we focus initially
on a two-player model, which helps us understand “worst case” manipulative behavior. Among other
things, we study what effect, if any, the uncertainty around the participation of some outcome-deciders
has on the actions of a strategic agent when there is incentive for manipulation.
Our model is a two-stage game. In the first stage, the two players have the opportunity to partici-
pate (sequentially) in a prediction market mediated by a market scoring rule or MSR [Hanson 2007a]
market-maker. In the second stage, the two players take public actions which we term “votes” for
convenience, although in general they model each participant’s role in determining the outcome. The
payoffs from the stage one prediction market are determined by the stage two vote. While the model is
simple, the analysis yields several interesting theoretical insights.
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2. MODEL
Let τ ∈ T denote the unknown type of the “entity” on which the combined market and voting mech-
anism is predicated (e.g. for the vote-share prediction market of a two-candidate election, the “entity”
would be one of the two candidates). The two agents, whom we call Alice and Bob (A and B in sub-
scripts) following convention [Chen et al. 2009], receive private signals sA, sB ∈ Ω = {0, 1}. The prior
distribution Pr(τ) on the type and the conditional joint distribution Pr(sA, sB |τ) on the private signals
given the type are common knowledge. Let q0(s) , Pr (sB = 0|sA = s), s ∈ {0, 1} denote Alice’s posterior
probability that Bob received the signal sB = 0, given her own signal and common knowledge.
In the market stage (the starting market price is assumed to be p0 = 1/2), Alice trades first with an
MSR market maker and changes the price to pA. Then, it is Bob’s turn to trade but he may not show
up with a probability pi (known to Alice) which is called Bob’s non-participation probability; if he does
trade, he changes the price to pB . In the voting stage, Alice and Bob simultaneously announce signals
vA, vB respectively from Ω = {0, 1}. The liquidation value of the market security is the average vote
v = (vA + vB) /2 ∈ {0, 12 , 1}. 1 If Bob did not trade in the first stage, we assume that he votes truthfully,
declaring his private signal. Any agent participating in the market is Bayesian and strategic, and their
payoff is given by ri(pi, pj , vA, vB) = s (pi, (vA + vB)/2)− s (pj , (vA + vB)/2) , i ∈ {A,B}, where s(·, ·) is
the strictly proper scoring rule used to implement the market; j = 0 for i = A, j = A for i = B.
3. EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS
LEMMA 3.1. If Alice updates the market price to pA > p0 = 1/2 (resp. pA < 1/2), then her rational
vote is vA = 1 (resp. vA = 0), regardless of Bob’s vote.
LEMMA 3.2. Under mild assumptions, there exist unique values pL ∈ (0, 1/2) and pH ∈ (1/2, 1) such
that if pA > 1/2 (resp. pA < 1/2), then Bob’s rational vote is vB = 1 if pA ≤ pH also (resp. if pA < pL
also), and is vB = 0 otherwise. Table I gives the values of pL, pH for three representative scoring rules.
Logarithmic MSR Quadratic MSR Spherical MSR
pL 0.2 0.25 0.2725
pH 0.8 0.75 0.7275
Table I.
For example, if Bob does trade and observes pA ∈ (1/2, pH), then his rational action is to drive pB all
the way to 1 and vote vB = 1, but if pA ∈ (pH , 1), then he should set pB = 1/2 and vote vB = 0.
With the help of the above lemmas, we can show that for every (pi, q0) pair, the perfect Bayesian
equilibrium of this game belongs to one of two possible categories, depending on Bob’s participation
probability. Below a threshold on Bob’s probability of participation in the trading stage, say (1 − pic),
we call the equilibrium a low participation probability (LPP) equilibrium, and above (1 − pic), we call
it a high participation probability (HPP) equilibrium. The cross-over probability pic is a function of the
MSR used and the value of q0 (Alice’s posterior on Bob’s signal), as shown in Figure 1.
Main result: In a LPP equilibrium, Alice predicts Bob’s vote, and then bases her trading on the
optimal combination of her own vote and Bob’s vote, and the prediction market price is reflective of
the expected outcome. In a HPP (collusive) equilibrium, on the contrary, Alice expects Bob to enter
and collude with her, and she chooses a prediction market price that allows Bob and her to “split the
profit” (not necessarily evenly); specifically, she sets pA = pH if q0 < 1/2 and pA = pL if q0 > 1/2. We
can analyze the characteristics of these equilibria from the following two perspectives.
1In general, we can have v = αvA + (1− α)vB , α ∈ (0, 1), where α models the degree of control that Alice alone exerts over the
final outcome. Here, we focus on the special case α = 1
2
as a starting point where both agents are equally powerful.
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Fig. 1: Left to right: the dependence of the cross-over probability (Bob’s non-participation probably that serves as the threshold
between the two types of equilibria) on Alice’s posterior probability of Bob having a signal 0 for the logarithmic (LMSR), quadratic
(QMSR), and spherical (SMSR) scoring rules. For example, for QMSR, if q0 = 0.25, then pic ≈ 0.9537, so we have a LPP
equilibrium with pA = (1 + pi(1− q0))/2 for pi > 0.9537, and a HPP equilibrium with pA = pH = 0.75 for pi < 0.9537. Note the
peculiar form of the graph for LMSR due to the properties of the logarithmic scoring function.
3.1 Informativeness of prices
We can examine the information on the outcome conveyed by prices after each stage of trading.
Bob trades Bob does not trade
LPP HPP LPP HPP
pA Bayesian estimate Predetermined, ∈ {pL, pH} Bayesian estimate Predetermined, ∈ {pL, pH}
pB v (actual outcome) v (actual outcome) Bayesian estimate Predetermined, ∈ {pL, pH}
Here “Bayesian estimate” means that pLPPA = E
[
v|pi, q0, pA = pLPPA
]
, that is, Alice’s posterior expecta-
tion of the average vote conditional on the information available at that time to everyone but Bob, and
hence an effective disseminator of information (note that if Bob does not trade, the final price pB = pA).
3.2 Truthfulness of actions
It is easily seen that the trading actions of either agent do not necessarily reveal their private signals.
Regardless of whether the equilibrium is LPP or HPP, if Bob does end up participating in the trading
stage, his vote is fully determined already by Alice’s trading choice, independent of his signal.
Alice’s trading decision, on the other hand, is based on her belief about Bob’s signal which, in our
Bayesian setting, has an indirect dependence on her own information. In fact, under the mild assump-
tion of stochastic relevance [Miller et al. 2005] of Alice’s signal for Bob’s signal, i.e. if q0(sA = 0) 6=
q0(sA = 1), it is possible to recover Alice’s true signal sA from her price-update pA in an LPP equilib-
rium since pLPPA is a simple function of pi (known) and q0. This stands in contrast to the situation where
Bob’s participation is certain, an extreme case of the HPP domain. In an HPP equilibrium, pA is merely
a (known) constant independent of the actual values of the belief parameters; the only information we
can extract from it is whether q0 > 1/2 (for pA = pL) or q0 < 1/2 (for pA = pH ), which is insufficient for
deducing sA uniquely in the absence of further assumptions on the belief structure. Thus, for a suffi-
ciently high probability that the successor (Bob) will not trade and will vote truthfully (i.e. pi > pic), the
predecessor, though strategic, is forced to act in a way that divulges her private information indirectly!
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